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Bandung: The Event 
Professorial Lecture by Walden Bello
This essay is a distillation of thoughts triggered by various requests to consider 
the significance of the Bandung Conference during the 60th anniversary of 
the historic event in 2015.
Bandung in 1955 was a momentous historic event in the sense that 
the French philosopher Alain Badiou defines an “event”: a moment, a 
particular conjunction of forces and developments that illuminates the 
horizon of possibilities for social liberation.1
PROMISE
Bandung, which saw the Third World or Global South get together 
for the first time, with iconic leaders like Chou En Lai, Nasser, 
Sukarno, and Nehru, had the same significance as the French 
Revolution of 1789 and the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917. It was 
a historic distillation of the scores of national independence and 
national liberation struggles that had occurred till then and that were 
still going to take place in the Global South. It pointed to a reality 
seeking to emerge from the internal and international structures 
oppression and exploitation: to a new era of freedom and equality 
among nations and within nations. Thus, Bandung represented the 
reality as well as the potential and the horizon of possibilities of 
global political and economic liberation.
The wave of liberation represented in Bandung carried forward to 
the Cuban Revolution of 1959 and Algerian independence in 1962, 
and reached its apogee in 1973–1975 with the triumph of national 
liberation movements in Mozambique, Angola, Guinea Bissau, 
Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.
COUNTERREVOLUTION
However, like the French Revolution and the Bolshevik Revolution, 
that glimpse of the horizon of possibilities offered by Bandung was 
succeeded by setbacks, by counterrevolutions inspired by imperialism. 
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There were the bloody coups against Sukarno in Indonesia in 1965 
and against Allende in Chile in 1973.
Then there was structural adjustment and neoliberal structuring 
that accompanied corporate driven globalization, whose main successes 
were the neoliberal transformation of the Indian economy beginning 
in the early 1990s, the capitalist transformation of China from 1984 
on, and, of course, the collapse of actually existing socialism in Eastern 
Europe. Like the Congress of Vienna in relation to the French 
Revolution after 1815, and the fascist and Nazi counterrevolutions in 
relation to the Bolshevik Revolution, the aim of the US-led imperial 
reaction and the neoliberal globalization to kill the glimpse of the 
future offered by Bandung.
Yet it was not only imperialism and global capitalism that propelled 
the retreat of the vision of Bandung. Factors internal to progressive 
forces were also at work, the most prominent being the prolonged 
deterioration and collapse of the centralized socialist regimes in 
1989–1992, and the ossification of many anti-colonial movements 
into personalist, party, or bureaucratic regimes. This lapse into political 
formations that were the opposite of the Bandung vision—where the 
state became the property of a person, a party, or a social group, instead 
of becoming an instrument of popular liberation—was one of the 
factors that contributed to the siren song of neoliberal restructuring in 
the 1980s and 1990s.
The clouding of the horizon of possibilities offered by the event 
that was Bandung led to many intellectuals abandoning the promise 
of Bandung, some lapsing into cynicism, invoking its rhetoric but 
abandoning its substance, some embracing neoliberalism outright. 
Others remained mechanically faithful to Bandung, refusing to 
acknowledge the deviations or internal lapses of progressive movements. 
Others maintained their fidelity to Bandung but also adopted a self-
critical attitude, asking the question, where did we go wrong?
WHERE DID WE GO WRONG?
I am mainly interested in the response of this third group, this self-
critical response that has kept faith in the Bandung vision, that did 
not attribute the retreat of that vision to the power of imperialism 
and capitalism alone. There have been four institutions, associated 
with progressive movements at the time of Bandung, institutions 
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that were seen as the instruments of liberation and equality, that have 
been subjected to critical dissection: socialism, the state, democracy, 
and the party.
Socialism. Coming out of Bandung were different variants of 
socialism, to which many countries emerging from colonialism 
were generally sympathetic: Marxist-Leninist socialism, African 
socialism, Arab socialism, among others. The dominant version that 
dominated in the 40 years after Bandung was a top-down socialism 
wherein the state controlled the means of production, bureaucrats 
managed the economy via central planning, and there was little or 
no genuine democratic participation either in politics or economic 
management. This created a deadly combination of inefficiency in 
production and political dispossession that made the populations of 
the decolonized and socialist words vulnerable to the blandishments 
of imperialism and capitalism, and culminated in the collapse of the 
socialist governments in Eastern Europe and the reintroduction of 
capitalism in China, Vietnam, and many other post-colonial societies 
from the 1990s on.
State. In the visions of development that came out of Bandung, 
whether the national developmental vision or the socialist vision, the 
state was seen as the institution that would tame the market and 
corporations, serve as the engine of development, express the general 
will and realize the common good. In fact, in many instances, the 
state came to exercise the monopoly of coercion, political power, and 
economic resources by a new elite based on political party affiliation, 
ethnic affiliation, and intellectual/educational privileges. In many 
cases, behind the rhetoric of national development or socialist 
development, the state became the engine of accumulation of a new 
bourgeoisie.
Democracy. Allegiance to democracy was a common feature of 
many of the decolonized nations that emerged in the global South, 
but the reality was, in many cases, very far from democratic. Some 
had electoral democracies where elites competed for political 
power but united to maintain unequal socio-economic systems. 
Some developed Bonapartist democracies where populist leaders 
discouraged institutionalization of democratic rules in favor of a 
kind of direct connection between them and the masses through 
mass mobilizations. Some were so-called democratic regimes that 
were actually party dictatorships justified in the name of preventing 
counterrevolutionaries from destabilizing society.
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The party. Even where they were not socialist or communist in 
orientation, many post-colonial regimes emulated the democratic 
centralist model of a disciplined vanguard leading the revolution 
from above and monopolizing decision-making since it was in the 
best position to understand the dynamics of national and class 
struggle. This led to many abuses, including the domination of the 
government by a parallel party system, the actual rule of middle class 
intelligentsia over peasants, workers, and other marginalized groups, 
and the denial of human rights to groups and individuals that did 
not belong to the classes privileged by the party. The genocidal 
policies of the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia from 1975 to 1978 was 
a tragic lesson of how a progressive political elite could go radically 
wrong, giving ammunition to the right-wing claim that the three 
moments of social liberation —the French Revolution, the Bolshevik 
Revolution, and the Bandung vision—were the deadly panaceas of 
alienated free-floating intellectuals.2
CIVIL SOCIETY AND ITS DISCONTENTS
Despite the setbacks suffered by these institutions of liberation, 
however, the masses throughout the South largely kept faith with 
the vision of liberation, equality among societies, and equality within 
societies offered by Bandung, many of them spontaneously, not 
even aware of the historic event that was Bandung. From the 1990s 
on, a major new actor reinvigorated the struggle for liberation and 
equality: civil society. Civil society is that complex of social sectors, 
social institutions, and social organizations that lies outside both the 
state and market but interacts with them. Civil society is diverse, 
being composed of communities, functional groups, professional 
groups, and pressure groups. In the national liberation or national 
independence models of change, civil society organizations were 
often seen mainly as passive actors to be harnessed to the objectives 
of the state and political parties.
But even as governments and parties were drastically weakened 
by neoliberalism in the 1980s and 1990s, the inevitable social crises 
triggered the emergence of dynamic civil society groups that addressed 
the environmental, gender, social, and political inequalities. Civil 
society formations stemming from women’s struggle for equality, 
indigenous people’s drive for liberation, and the desire to protect the 
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planet from devastation were a key new source of dynamism and 
creativity in the struggle to realize the vision of Bandung. Progressive 
civil society formations were united by a common stand against 
neoliberal policies. They drew their strength from their decentralized 
operations, their participatory and non-hierarchical decision-making 
structures, and their ability to organize across borders, features which 
were celebrated in Hardt and Negri’s book Empire.3
These civil society networks have had an ambivalent relation to 
governments. On the one hand, the power of 50,000 people in the 
streets of Seattle combined with the resistance of developing country 
governments brought down the Third Ministerial of the WTO. On 
the other hand, governments, even progressive ones, have often 
been threatened by their activities, especially by their upholding of 
participatory democracy as a means of decision-making at all levels 
of social organization. 
These civil society networks have also had an ambivalent 
relationship to the traditional political parties of the left. Despite 
these differences, however, they have worked together, the best 
example being the World Social Forum. Perhaps a compelling 
reason for the modus vivendi of the old and new movements was 
the realization that they needed one another in the struggle against 
global capitalism, and that the strength of the fledgling global 
movement lay in a strategy of non-hierarchical networking that 
rested not on the doctrinal belief that one class was destined to lead 
the struggle, but on the reality of the common marginalization of 
practically all subordinate classes, strata, and groups under the reign 
of global capital.
The Anti-Globalization Movement and its successor the Occupy 
Movement showed both the dynamism of transnational civil society 
networks and their limitations. The strengths of these networks were 
oftentimes also their weaknesses: their decentralized character, their 
dislike of hierarchy and representative systems of decision-making, 
and their being averse to institutionalizing processes. A key problem 
has been the ambivalence of civil society networks to power. It is, 
however, necessary to deal with power and to use it instead of just 
resisting its use. As Hugo Chavez asked us during the 2006 WSF 
meeting in Caracas, civil society activists had no choice but to address 
the question of power: “We must have a strategy of ‘counter-power.’ 
We, the social movements and political movements, must be able to 
move into spaces of power at the local, national, and regional level.”4
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This political disarmament may have its roots in a theoretical 
disarmament occasioned by the ambivalence of the concept of civil 
society towards capitalism. As the late Ellen Meiksins Wood noted, 
we are so used to thinking about civil society as the realm of freedom 
vis-à-vis the state that we forget the coercions of the institutions 
of the market and Capital that are also part of civil society. Let me 
quote her at length since summarizing her would not do justice to 
her thought:
“Civil society” has given private property and its possessors 
a command over people and their daily lives, a power 
accountable to no one, which many an old tyrannical 
state would have envied. Those activities and experiences 
which fall outside the immediate command structure 
of the capitalist enterprise, or outside the political 
power of capital, are regulated by the dictates of the 
market, the necessities of competition and profitability. 
 Even when the market is not, as it commonly is in 
advanced capitalist societies, merely an instrument of power 
for giant conglomerates and multinational corporations, 
it is still a coercive force, capable of subjecting all human 
values, activities, and relationships to its imperatives. No 
ancient despot could have hoped to penetrate the personal 
lives of his subjects—their choices, preferences, and 
relationships—in the same comprehensive and minute detail, 
not only in the workplace but in every corner of their lives. 
 Coercion, in other words, has been not just a disorder 
of “civil society” but one of  its constitutive principles. This 
historical reality tends to undermine the neat distinctions 
required by current theories which ask us to treat civil 
society as, at least in principle, the sphere of freedom 
and voluntary action, the antithesis of the irreducibly 
coercive principle which intrinsically belongs to the state. 
 What tends to disappear from view, again, is the 
relations of exploitation and domination which irreducibly 
constitute civil society, not just as some alien and correctible 
disorder but as its very essence, the particular structure of 
domination and coercion that is specific to capitalism as a 
systemic totality.5
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CAPITAL
This brings me to my final point: the need to overcome or transcend 
capitalism as an imperative of social and political liberation. When 
the Bandung Conference took place, capitalism was in the first decade 
of its long post-World War II boom. Transformed by Keynesian 
reforms, capitalism was dynamic, expansive, and ideologically 
compelling, owing to its perceived ability to deliver higher living 
standards to the masses in the Global North. Even among many 
of the governments present in Bandung, developmental capitalism 
was the road to travel.
Today, capitalism has delivered two crises which have severely 
eroded its attractiveness as a way to organize economic life. One 
is the worst economic crisis since the Great Depression, which 
is rooted in the contradictions at the level of the relations of 
production. This crisis, which broke out in 2008, is deepening. 
The third phase of the global financial crisis, following the Wall 
Street crash and Europe’s sovereign debt crisis, has been the lapse 
of the so-called BRICS into stagnation. The deflationary collapse 
of commodity prices along with a downturn in production and 
growing inequality all around make it unlikely that a reinvigoration 
of global capitalism similar to that induced eight decades earlier by 
Keynesianism is on the horizon.
The other crisis fostered by capitalism is even more 
fundamental, one at the level of its appropriation of nature. This 
has tremendous implications for the realization of the vision of 
Bandung. As Jason Moore writes, “At stake is an interpretation 
of global crisis appropriate to our times, and relevant to our era’s 
movements for liberation. It is an open question as to whether 
we are facing a developmental crisis of capitalism—one open to 
resolution—through new rounds of primitive accumulation and 
commodification—or an epochal crisis, one marked by an irreversible 
decline in capital’s capacity to restructure its way of out great 
crises.”6 Capitalism’s relation to Nature has reached a boiling point, 
for “the appropriation of Cheap Nature has not only compelled 
capital to seek out new sources of labor power, food, energy, and 
raw materials, but to enclose the atmosphere as a gigantic dumping 
ground for greenhouse gases. This enclosure . . . is today generating 
barriers to capital accumulation that are unprecedented, especially 
in agriculture.”7 
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BANDUNG AND BARBARISM 
Amidst this overdetermined crisis of Capital, the vision of Bandung 
remains valid and inspiring, but to realize that glimpse of human 
liberation it offered requires a more fundamental confrontation with 
capitalism, one that embraces its transcendence, and a deepening 
of the creative rethinking, reconfiguration, and rearticulation of 
the institutions or mechanisms of liberation that the progressive 
movement has developed as its main instruments for change: the 
state, the party, democracy, and civil society.  
This rethinking of means and ends in the face of the epochal 
crisis of capitalism is in progress today. The end, I submit, must be 
a post-capitalist society, whatever one calls it, whether “socialism,” 
“democratic socialism,” or “economic democracy.” As I have argued 
elsewhere, contrary to the opinion of some, I think that the lessons 
of the collapse of centralized socialism coupled with innovative 
alternative thinking in alternative economics, feminist economics, 
and ecological economics over the last forty years have yielded the 
broad principles of such a post-capitalist order, principles that need 
to be specified to the particularities, rhythms, and values of different 
societies.  The point I want to emphasize here is this revolutionary 
theoretical and practical challenge to those of us who remain faithful 
to the Bandung moment is urgent and momentous.  
Our failure to meet this challenge could be catastrophic. In this 
regard, let me just share a disturbing insight that came out of my 
investigation of the background of the two young people who carried 
out the massacre at the French publication Charlie Hebdo in January 
2015, Cherif and Said Hoauchi, one that brought home Rosa 
Luxemburg’s dramatic posing of the alternatives as either “socialism 
or barbarism.” These two were offspring of Algerian immigrants to 
France, but their conditions of existence were very much like young 
people now growing up in the slums of cities in large parts of Africa, 
the Middle East, and Asia. With the ossification of progressive 
secular politics, ethnic, cultural, national, and racial themes came 
to dominate public debate in their world. For the youth of the 
slums, the vacuum created by the absence of the left had critical 
consequences. As one scholar put it, “the traditional character of the 
left-wing activist supporting the population’s collective protest is 
disappearing behind the religious figure embodying the alternative 
route for a dignified and moral life in a city ‘outside the real world,’ 
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in a community protected from a society perceived as being impure.” 
Reading accounts of their trajectory, one cannot but entertain the 
possibility that in other circumstances, Cherif and Said Kouachi 
would probably have been ripe for recruitment into a progressive 
movement. But with no figure on the secular left to provide guidance 
to their feelings of injustice and their idealism, that vacuum, in the 
case of Cherif, was filled by a devout jihadist of Algerian descent 
who tirelessly held discussion groups with impressionable young 
men, encouraging them to join jihad and setting up, according to one 
investigative report, a pipeline for young Muslims to travel to join 
Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s Al Qaeda’s network in Iraq.  
It is said that nature abhors a vacuum. If the forces that value the 
vision of Bandung, that continue to be faithful to it, do not fill the 
vacuum by making it again inspiring to today and tomorrow’s youth, 
others will. Liberation is not inevitable. It is contingent. I thank you.
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